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Targeted killing sits at the intersection of law, morality, 
strategy, and policy. For the very reasons that lawful and 
effective targeted killing enables the state to engage in its core 
function of self-defense and defense of its nationals, I am a 
proponent of targeted killing. However, my support for targeted 
killing is conditioned upon it being subject to rigorous 
standards, criteria, and guidelines. At present, new conceptions 
of threat and new technological capabilities are drastically 
affecting the implementation of targeted killing and the 
application of core legal and moral principles. High-level 
decision makers have begun to seemingly place a 
disproportionate level of importance on tactical and strategic 
gain over respect for a narrow definition of criteria-based legal 
and moral framework. Nonetheless, an effective targeted killing 
provides the state with significant advantages in the context of 
counterterrorism. Rather than relying on the executive branch 
making decisions in a “closed world” devoid of oversight and 
review, the intelligence information justifying the proposed 
action must be submitted to a court that would ascertain the 
information’s admissibility. The process of preparing and 
submitting available intelligence information to a court would 
significantly contribute to minimizing operational error that 
otherwise would occur. 
CONTENTS 
 
I. Introduction ........................................................................... 236 
II. Fundamental Concepts ........................................................... 241 
A. Morality in Armed Conflict .......................................................... 241 
B. Nature of Conflict ....................................................................... 243 
C. Role of Modern Technology .......................................................... 245 
III. The Decision-Making Process ............................................... ..245 
A. The Importance of Process .......................................................... 246 
B. Who Are Legitimate Targets? ...................................................... 248 
C. Is the Intelligence Actionable? ...................................................... 250 
D. Is the Response Proportional? ...................................................... 252 
* Professor of Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah; 
author of LEGITIMATE TARGET: A CRITERIA-BASED APPROACH TO 
TARGETED KILLING (Oxford Uni. Press, forthcoming). 
235 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Targeted Killing 
IV. The Drone Policy .................................................................... 254 
V.   Conclusion ............................................................................... 256 
 
I. Introduction 
Targeted killing sits at the intersection of law, morality, strategy, 
and policy. For the very reasons that lawful and effective targeted 
killing enables the state to engage in its core function of self-defense 
and defense of its nationals, I am a proponent of targeted killing. 
However, my support for targeted killing is conditioned upon it being 
subject to rigorous standards, criteria, and guidelines. My advocacy of 
both targeted killing and criteria-based decision-making rests largely 
on my twenty years of experience with a “seat at the table” of 
operational counterterrorism. The dangers inherent in the use of state 
power are enormous. On the opposite side of the equation, however, is 
the terrible cost of terrorism because terrorists, in deliberately 
targeting innocent civilians, disregard both legality and morality.  
At present, new conceptions of threat and new technological 
capabilities are drastically affecting the implementation of targeted 
killing and the application of core legal and moral principles. High-
level decision makers have begun to seemingly place a 
disproportionate level of importance on tactical and strategic gain 
over respect for a narrow definition of criteria-based legal and moral 
framework.1 Given the realities of collateral damage and other 
inevitable consequences, such an emphasis on tactical and strategic 
gain is troublesome. Nonetheless, an effective targeted killing provides 
the nation state with significant advantages in the context of 
counterterrorism. 
The fine line that separates the competing needs for both an 
effective counterterrorism strategy and a governing legal and moral 
framework is paper thin. While success is undoubtedly seductive, 
1. An earlier version of this article was published at e-International 
Relations. See Amos N. Guiora, Targeted Killing: The Limits of Power, 
E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.e-ir.info/2012 
/09/04/targeted-killing-the-limits-of-power/. Throughout this article I 
will refer to the “morality” or “moral framework” at issue in targeted 
killings. Proponents of targeted killings frequently rely on the legal, 
tactical, and strategic justifications and overlook the moral implications 
of targeted killings. In contrast, opponents of targeted killings frequently 
cite the morality—or lack thereof—as an argument against targeted 
killings. Those who support and order targeted killings need to look 
beyond the legal framework and confront the moral component of 
targeted killing policy. For an extensive report on the real-life impact of 
targeted killing, which might guide such an evaluation, see generally 
STANFORD INT’L HUM. RTS. & CONFLICT RES. CLINIC & NYU GLOBAL 
JUSTICE CLINIC, LIVING UNDER DRONES: DEATH, INJURY AND TRAUMA TO 
CIVILIANS FROM U.S. DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN (2012).  
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decision makers must consider the ramifications of a targeted killing 
gone awry. The seemingly surgical precision of a drone attack is so 
powerful and alluring that it has the potential to blind us from its 
powerful and compelling downsides—and from the legal and moral 
failures that it may well spawn.  
In the current environment, the international principle of 
proportionality is out of proportion. Expanded notions of imminence, 
flexibly and broadly defined, married with increasing reliance on sleek 
new technology, lie at the heart of re-conceptions of proportionality 
capacious enough to encompass nearly all targeting decisions.  
This essay, the foundation of which is my experience in 
operational counterterrorism, is intended to be a clarion call proposing 
the United States undertake, immediately and intensely, a significant 
re-appraisal of its counterterrorism policy. These words, written in 
August 2012, were unfortunately prescient: when I penned them, it 
was not my expectation U.S. drone policy would take on a deeply 
troubling and problematic nature.  
Unfortunately, the recently released Department of Justice white 
paper2 regarding the Obama Administration’s drone policy raises 
profound concerns regarding its legality and morality. The White 
Paper:  
[S]ets forth a legal framework for considering the circumstances 
in which the U.S. government could use lethal force in a foreign 
country outside the area of active hostilities against a U.S. 
citizen who is a senior operational leader of al-Qa’ida or an 
associated force of al-Qa’ida—that is, an al-Qa’ida leader 
actively engaged in planning operations to kill Americans.3 
According to the white paper, the United States would be able to 
use lethal force against a U.S. citizen, who is located outside the 
United States and is an operational leader continually planning 
attacks against U.S. persons and interests, in at least when:  
(1) an informed, high-level official of the U.S. government has 
determined that the targeted individual poses an imminent 
threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture 
operation is infeasible—and the United States continues to 
monitor whether capture becomes feasible; and (3) the operation 
2. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed 
Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al Qaida 
or an Associated Force (White Paper, undated), available at http:// 
msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Pa
per.pdf.  
3. Id. at 1.  
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would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law 
of war principles.4 
However, the White Paper dramatically broadens the definition of 
legitimate target: 
[T]he condition that an operational leader present an 
“imminent” threat of violent attack against the United States 
does not require the United States to have clear evidence that a 
specific attack on U.S. persons and interests will take place in 
the immediate future.5 
Experience tragically shows that when a “legitimate” target is 
broadly defined, significant collateral damage is inevitable. Needless 
to say, the grave dangers emanating from the White Paper raise 
deeply disturbing questions regarding the policy’s legality, morality 
and effectiveness.  
The DOJ white paper both harkens back to the Bush 
Administration’s unitary executive theory and to the infamous Bybee 
Memo6 that established the Bush Administration’s torture regime. 
There is a powerful and disturbing link between the Obama 
Administration’s drone policy and the Bush Administration’s 
interrogation policy. When writing a previous book, Constitutional 
Limits of Coercive Interrogation,7 I met with U.S. interrogators based 
in Iraq. Their most striking request was that guidelines and criteria 
regarding limits of interrogation be clearly articulated in detailed 
written instructions. Their “demand” was predicated on a deeply held 
conviction (with which I agreed) that the Bybee Memo established a 
paradigm best described as “by all means necessary” and grave 
concern their command structure would demand interrogation 
measures in violation of domestic and international law.  
Re-articulated: experienced interrogators were convinced 
superiors, in accordance with the Bybee Memo, would demand they 
violate the law. By analogy, it is troubling, albeit reasonable, to 
presuppose the White Paper will result in actions that violate 
domestic and international law. Not because commanders are 
inherently prone to nor particularly relish committing crimes; 
nevertheless, the White Paper has created an unduly (and unfair) 
complicated dilemma for commanders and decision makers. The 
4. Id.  
5. Id. at 7. 
6. See Michael Scherer, Bush Torture Memo Approved Use of Insects, 
TIME, Apr. 16, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599, 
1891812,00.html.  
7. AMOS N. GUIORA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COERCIVE INTERROGATION 
(Oxford Uni. Press, 2008). 
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combination of defining legitimate target as “senior, Al-Qaeda 
operational leader” including U.S. citizens and an extraordinarily 
broad imminence definition creates a targeted killing paradigm akin to 
the interrogation excesses that followed in the wake of the Bybee 
Memo. 
Given the excessive paradigm the white paper articulates one can 
only recall the ageless and immortal words of Justice Robert Jackson 
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.8 While different context 
and distinct circumstances, Justice Jackson’s powerful warning 
regarding the unfettered executive ring as loudly today as they did 
when penned. Perhaps, with all due deference both to Justice Jackson 
and the facts before the Supreme Court in Youngstown, the words 
must be heard louder today. The reason: the paradigm established by 
the DOJ white paper facilitates the potential harm to human life—
including U.S. citizens—by an unfettered executive determining 
whether an individual is a legitimate target devoid of process and 
review.  
The unitary executive theory aggressively articulated, and 
implemented, by the Bush Administration has been adopted in toto 
by the Obama Administration. While the executive clearly prefers to 
operate in a vacuum, the question whether that most effectively 
ensures effective operational counterterrorism is an open question. 
The advantage of institutionalized, process-based input into executive 
action prior to decision implementation is worthy of discussion in 
operational counterterrorism. 
The solution to this search for an actionable guideline is the strict 
scrutiny standard. What is strict scrutiny, and how is it to be 
implemented in the context of operational counterterrorism? Why is 
there a need, if at all, for an additional standard articulating self-
defense? The strict scrutiny standard would enable operational 
engagement of a non-state actor predicated on intelligence 
information that would meet admissibility standards akin to a court 
of law. The strict scrutiny test seeks to strike a balance enabling the 
state to act sooner but subject to significant restrictions. 
The ability to act sooner is limited, however, by the requirement 
that intelligence information must be reliable, viable, valid, and 
corroborated. The strict scrutiny standard proposes that for states to 
act as early as possible in order to prevent a possible terrorist attack 
the information must meet admissibility standards similar to the rules 
of evidence. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and probative.   
8. 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (“When the President acts in absence of either 
a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is 
uncertain.”). 
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The proposal is predicated on the understanding that while states 
need to engage in operational counterterrorism, mistakes regarding 
the correct interpretation and analysis of intelligence information can 
lead to tragic mistakes. Adopting admissibility standards akin to the 
criminal law minimizes operational error.  
Rather than relying on the executive branch making decisions in a 
“closed world” devoid of oversight and review, the intelligence 
information justifying the proposed action must be submitted to a 
court that would ascertain the information’s admissibility. The 
discussion before the court would necessarily be conducted ex parte; 
however, the process of preparing and submitting available 
intelligence information to a court would significantly contribute to 
minimizing operational error that otherwise would occur. 
The logistics of this proposal are far less daunting than they 
might seem—the court before which the executive would submit the 
evidence is the FISA Court. Presently, FISA Court judges weigh the 
reliability of intelligence information in determining whether to grant 
government ex parte requests for wire-tapping warrants. Under this 
proposal, judicial approval is necessary prior to undertaking a 
counterterrorism operation predicated solely on intelligence 
information. The standard the court would adopt in determining the 
information’s reliability is the same applied in the traditional criminal 
law paradigm. The intelligence must be reliable, material, and 
probative. 
While the model is different—a defense attorney cannot question 
state witnesses—the court will assume a dual role. In this dual role 
capacity the court will cross-examine the representative of the 
intelligence community and subsequently rule as to the information’s 
admissibility. While some may suggest that the FISA court is largely 
an exercise in “rubber-stamping,” the importance of the proposal is in 
requiring the government to present the available information to an 
independent judiciary as a precursor to engaging in operational 
counterterrorism.  
The call is complicated: the United States is a nation based on 
democratic values rooted in ethics and morals; yet, when push comes 
to shove the United States does not always act in accordance with 
these articulated principles. The vision of a “city upon a hill,” 
articulated by Puritan settler John Winthrop and subsequently 
referenced by President Ronald Reagan,9 has been called into question 
by certain U.S. counterterrorism measures. This is not the first time 
9. See President Ronald Reagan, Farewell Address to the Nation (Jan. 11, 
1989), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/19 
89/011189i.htm. 
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that American responses in the face of crisis (whether real or 
perceived) have reflected “over-board” and “over-broad” approaches.10  
Although targeted killing is applied in a wide array of 
circumstances and locations, such as Afghanistan, it is the use of 
targeted killings as self-defense against individuals deemed as posing a 
direct threat to national security11 that raises a significantly broader 
and more complex set of considerations, extending beyond the law of 
armed conflict and its application. U.S. counterterrorism policy, and 
targeted killing strategy in particular, highlights a number of 
important issues: 1) a failure to articulate threats in a manner that 
defines and operationalizes imminence in a careful, effective, and 
moral way; 2) an over-reliance on technology in intelligence-gathering 
and potentially intelligence analysis; 3) ends-based decision making 
rather than decision making based on morality and law; and 4) a 
failure to develop and use a process to move from the articulation of a 
threat to the lethal targeting decision in a discriminating, moral, and 
law-based manner. 
II. Fundamental Concepts 
A. Morality in Armed Conflict 
One of the dominant, and admittedly controversial, arguments 
this essay advances is that states have an obligation to conduct 
themselves morally, including during armed conflict. Although some 
may find this notion inherently contradictory, “morality in armed 
conflict” is a term of art (and not an oxymoron) that lies at the core 
of the instant discussion. This concept imposes an absolute 
requirement that soldiers treat the civilian population of areas in 
which they are engaged in conflict with the utmost dignity and 
respect. This obligation holds true whether combat takes place 
“house-to-house” or using remotely piloted aircraft tens of thousands 
of feet up in the sky. This concept may be simple to articulate, yet it 
is difficult to implement; the operational reality of armed conflict 
short of war requires a soldier to make multiple decisions involving 
various factors, all of which have never-ending spin-off potential. 
After all, every decision is not only complicated in and of itself, but 
10. See, e.g., Amy Zegart, Taking Resilience Too Far, SLATE (Mar. 19, 
2012),jhttp://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/03 
/reilience_in_national_security_is_overrated_.html.  
11. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at 
the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 
25, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/1391 
19.htm; Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Speech at 
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051 
.html.  
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each operational situation has a number of “forks.” The implication is 
that no decision is linear, and every decision leads to additional 
dilemmas and spurs further decision making.  
Operational decision-making is thus predicated on a complicated 
triangle that must incorporate the rule of law, morality, and 
effectiveness. I have been asked repeatedly whether that triangle 
endangers soldiers while giving the “other side” an undue advantage. 
The concern is understandable; however, the essence of armed conflict 
is that innocent civilians are in the immediate vicinity of combatants, 
and there is a duty to protect them even at the risk of harm to 
soldiers.12 The burden to distinguish between combatant and civilian 
is extraordinarily complicated and poses significant operational 
dilemmas for and burdens on soldiers.  
For armed conflict conducted in accordance with the rule of law 
and morality, this burden of distinction can never be viewed as mere 
mantra. Distinction,13 then, is integral to the discussion. It is as 
relevant and important to the soldier standing at a check-point, 
uncertain whether the person standing opposite him is a combatant or 
civilian, as it must be in any targeted killing dilemma. The decision 
whether to operationally engage must reflect a variety of criteria and 
guidelines.14 Otherwise, the nation state conducts itself in the spirit of 
a video game where victims are not real and represent mere numbers, 
regardless of the degree of threat they pose. 
At the most fundamental level, operational decision making in the 
context of counterterrorism involves the decision whether to kill an 
individual defined as a legitimate target.15 Although some argue 
killing is inherently immoral, I argue that killing in the context of 
narrowly defined self-defense is both legal and moral provided that 
the decision to “pull the trigger” is made in the context of a highly 
circumscribed and criteria-based framework. If limits are not imposed 
in defining a legitimate target, then decisions take on the hue of both 
illegality and immorality.  
12. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.  
13. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain 
Explosive Projectiles, Nov. 29–Dec. 11, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau 
Recueil (ser. 1) 474, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 (declaring “[t]hat the only 
legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy”).  
14. See Amos N. Guiora, Determining a Legitimate Target: The Dilemma of 
the Decisionmaker, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 315, 332–36 (2012).  
15. See id. at 336. 
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B. Nature of Conflict 
We are at a crossroads: traditional state war has morphed, by 
force of circumstances, into conflict between states and non-state 
actors. Traditionally, international law sought to establish criteria 
and limits by which nation states fought wars against other states, 
although violations of the laws of war inevitably occurred.16 
Nevertheless, the rules were clearly articulated and understood, 
although not always implemented or respected.17 The era of state 
versus non-state conflict, in contrast, has been marked by both 
random and deliberate attacks against innocent civilians by non-state 
actors.18  
The state, in response, has been forced to develop and implement 
operational counterterrorism measures intended to protect the civilian 
population while striking at those responsible for the attacks. Such 
response has been legitimate and necessary. The primary obligation of 
the state is to protect its innocent civilian population and valuable 
national resources and assets.19 While this obligation is unambiguous, 
the question remains: how can a state meet these obligations? Should 
there be limits imposed regarding the use of force? And if so, what are 
those limits? 
It is unfortunately easy in the face of terrorism to take an 
expansive view regarding self-defense and the definition of legitimate 
target. That “ease” is magnified in the immediate aftermath of an 
attack when the public, media, and politicians are clamoring for 
aggressive responses to strike at those responsible, and to deter those 
considering future acts of terrorism.20 The rhetoric in the United 
States immediately after 9/11 demonstrates how such calls for 
aggressive responses to terrorism play out. Former-U.S. Attorney 
General Alberto Gonzales’ disdainful description of international law 
16. See, e.g., Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land and Its Annex, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 
17. See Guiora, supra note 14, at 320.  
18. See generally UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, G.A. Res. 60/288, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/288 (Sept. 20, 2006). See also Richard A. Oppel 
Jr. & Taimoor Shah, Differing Theories in Killing of 17 in Taliban 
Stronghold, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2012, at A8 (discussing attacks on 
civilians by non-state actors). 
19. UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, supra note 18 (noting the 
threat non-state actors can pose to state security through acts of 
terrorism).  
20. See How 9/11 Changed How Americans View the World, NPR (Sept. 
10, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/09/10/160886676/how-9-11-chang 
ed-how-america-sees-the-world (discussing the often vast difference 
between public opinion immediately after a crisis and public opinion 
further removed from the crisis). 
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as “quaint”21 was matched only by former-Vice President Richard 
Cheney’s reference to water-boarding as a mere “dunk in the water.”22 
The result was an operational counterterrorism model predicated on 
lawlessness and state power subject neither to the rule of law nor 
morality. From the perspective of the “boots on the ground,” there is 
extraordinary danger when national decision makers adopt a 
paradigm best described as lawless.  
The concern for a moral and legal basis in conflict and 
counterterrorism operations is not based on compassion for terrorists. 
Anyone who deliberately targets innocent men, women, and children 
is a legitimate target.23 However, decision making subject to moral 
and legal restraints must go beyond an indiscriminate application of 
power that is devoid of articulated and narrowly applied criteria. 
Although collateral damage may well be inevitable to war and 
counterterrorism alike, it is nevertheless essential that states recognize 
their absolute obligation to proactively minimize the deaths of 
innocent individuals.  
That burden is unduly impacted by the callous decision by non-
state actors to deliberately place their innocent civilians in harm’s 
way. Human shielding is a clear violation of international law and 
reflects extraordinary disregard for the value of human life.24 As made 
clear during Operation Cast Lead (i.e., the Gaza War),25 terrorist 
organizations deliberately use their own civilians as human shields.26 
However, that fact does not and must not justify targeted killing that 
21. John D. Hutson & Heather MacDonald, Should Gonzales Be Attorney 
General?, LEGAL AFF. (Jan. 25, 2005, 10:27 AM), http://www.legalaffa 
irs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_gonzales0105.msp. 
22. See Snow: Cheney Doesn’t Support ‘Water Boarding,’ ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 27, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15443701/ns/p 
olitics/t/snow-cheney-doesnt-support-water-boarding/#.UIdaRUI1ZSW.  
23. See Charli Carpenter, Fighting the Laws of War, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.–
Apr. 2011, at 146 (discussing the challenges posed by modern warfare, 
but concluding that traditional laws of war, including those that 
prohibit targeting innocent civilians, still apply). 
24. See generally Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International 
Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 292 (2009).  
25. See Israel Says Gaza Death Toll Lower Than Claimed, CNN (Mar. 26, 
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-26/world/israel.gaza.death.toll_1 
_israeli-military-palestinians-civilian-deaths?_s=PM:WORLD 
(discussing Operation Cast Lead).  
26. See Terrorists Use Palestinian Civilians As Human Shields (Info Live 
television broadcast Jan. 1 2010), available at http://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=n_YP6AtdwJQ&feature=fvwrel; see also Cast Lead 
Video: Hamas Terrorist Uses Children as Human Shield, (Israeli Def. 
Forces online video Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch 
?v=2vHDyuSTneA.  
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results in undue collateral damage. The fact that terrorist 
organizations violate standards of law and morality must be 
universally condemned, but such conduct does not justify a paradigm 
in which collateral damage is tolerated. Ethical decision making, 
human judgment, a moral conscience, and the rule of law must all 
work together to ensure that Americans do not become the enemy we 
are fighting.27  
C. Role of Modern Technology 
The use of drones, also known as unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAV), has further complicated the relationship between 
counterterrorism, self-defense, and morality in armed conflict. Many 
argue that the combination of modern technology and sophisticated 
intelligence analysis all but ensures that UAV policy is the most 
effective contemporary means to conduct operational 
counterterrorism.28 The argument sounds compelling and convincing: 
what is more attractive than killing terrorists from the air with the 
use of sleek technology while minimizing risk to ground forces? We 
are in an age where shiny technology and seemingly sophisticated 
intelligence gathering and analysis converge, potentially removing the 
human element, and humanity, from decision making.29 However, 
targeted killing is fraught with extraordinary risk. Computers and 
advanced technology are, undoubtedly, essential to intelligence 
gathering and other important aspects of counterterrorism and armed 
conflict; suggesting otherwise would be folly. But the trend towards 
relaxed or flexible definitions of imminence, legitimate targets, and 
proportionality means that such an increasing reliance on technology 
can exacerbate rather than curtail these dangers. 
III. The Decision-Making Process 
The Obama Administration articulated a broad rationale for the 
Anwar al-Awlaki killing, based on the theory of aggressive self-
defense.30 More recently, the administration has acknowledged the 
broader drone program, again defending it as lawful: 
27. My gratitude to Margaret Hu for articulating this point so clearly for 
me.  
28. See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact 
the Law of War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675, 679, 701 (2011) (discussing 
the potential impact of unmanned drones on the law of armed conflicts). 
29. DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL 244 (2012) (reporting a top 
Obama Administration official’s concern that new technology distracts 
from human realities).  
30. John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our 
Values and Laws, Address at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16, 2011), 
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In practice, the U.S. approach to targeting in the conflict with 
al-Qa’ida is far more aligned with our allies’ approach than 
many assume. This Administration’s counterterrorism efforts 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals 
who are a threat to the United States, whose removal would 
cause a significant—even if only temporary—disruption of the 
plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces. 
Practically speaking, then, the question turns principally on how 
you define “imminence.”31 
We are finding increasing recognition in the international 
community that a more flexible understanding of “imminence” may be 
appropriate when dealing with terrorist groups, in part because 
threats posed by non-state actors do not present themselves in the 
ways that evidenced imminence in more traditional conflicts. After all, 
al-Qa’ida does not follow a traditional command structure, wear 
uniforms, carry its arms openly, or mass its troops at the borders of 
the nations it attacks. Nonetheless, it possesses the demonstrated 
capability to strike with little notice and cause significant civilian or 
military casualties. Over time, an increasing number of our 
international counterterrorism partners have begun to recognize that 
the traditional conception of what constitutes an “imminent” attack 
should be broadened in light of the modern-day capabilities, 
techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist organizations. 
A. The Importance of Process 
Effective counterterrorism requires the state to apply self-imposed 
restraint, otherwise violations of both international law and morality 
in armed conflict are all but inevitable. The manner in which a 
counterterrorism operation is carried out will determine its legality 
under governing international instruments. Among the many 
important international law principles applicable to targeted killing, 
the obligation of distinction sits at the pinnacle. The notion of 
counterterrorism as self-defense against imminent threats from 
terrorist or other non-state actors means that the state must know, in 
a detailed manner, who poses such a threat, in what circumstances, 
and how and when such person can be targeted.32 This information 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/re 
marks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-
an.  
31. Id.   
32. This section builds off a previous article, see Laurie Blank & Amos 
Guiora, Targeted Killing’s ‘Flexibility’ Doctrine that Enables US to 
Flout the Law of War, THE GUARDIAN (UK) Aug. 10, 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/aug/10/targeted-
killing-flexibility-doctrine-flout-law-war.  
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and analysis lies at the heart of the legitimate target determination. 
Next, the state (that is, those making decisions regarding targeted 
strikes) must undertake the necessary proportionality analysis: will 
civilians be harmed and if so, how many? In an effort to successfully 
minimize the number of innocent civilians killed during conflict 
(usually referred to by the unfortunate term “collateral damage”), the 
attacking party must refrain from any attacks where the expected 
civilian casualties will be excessive in relation to the anticipated 
military advantage gained.33  
In the end then, the lawfulness of targeted killing depends, in 
large part, on the efficacy of the internal administrative measures 
adopted to identify targets.34 Only when those procedures are effective 
and discriminating will targeted killing be both legal and moral. 
Why? Because targeted killing is not about encountering a division of 
the enemy’s forces on the battlefield and stopping it from advancing 
across the front towards your borders or essential infrastructure. Such 
are the tactics of traditional conflict, of trench warfare, and tank 
warfare in state versus state conflict. Targeted killing rests on the 
specific identification of individuals who pose an imminent threat to 
the state’s national security and are, therefore, legitimate targets 
within the framework of lawful self-defense.35 The state thus needs a 
method and a process for figuring out who poses a threat, why they 
pose a threat, and how that threat can be deterred or eliminated. 
Understanding more clearly what precisely those targeting procedures 
are is an important first step. Therefore, in any targeted killing 
decision, the following important questions must be addressed: 
 
1. Can the target be identified 
accurately and reliably?  
 Is the target legitimate? 
2. Does the target pose a threat such 
that an attack on the target at that 
moment is justified or are there 
alternatives available? 
 Is the intelligence 
actionable? 
3. What is the anticipated extent of 
collateral damage? 
 Is the response 
proportional? 
 
33. See Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted 
Killing, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 145, 148 (2010) (comparing targeted 
killing in international war and proportionality concerns to US domestic 
law enforcement and related principles of proportionality). 
34. Blank & Guiora, supra note 32.  
35. See Amos Guiora, Targeted Killing as Active Self Defense, 36 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 320, 325 (2004).  
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To answer these questions legally, morally, and effectively, 
decision makers must use a criteria-based process. Criteria-based 
decision making increases the probability of correctly identifying and 
attacking a legitimate target while minimizing collateral damage, 
thereby enhancing the policy’s effectiveness. The criteria-based 
process is dependent upon the gathering of intelligence information 
from three separate sources: human intelligence; signal intelligence; 
and open-source information.36 Intelligence analysts then determine 
whether the information is actionable.  
B. Who Are Legitimate Targets? 
The foundation for determining the legality of targeted killing is 
assessing whether the threat’s imminence justifies the action in order 
to protect an innocent civilian population.37 In order to implement 
legal, moral, and effective operational counterterrorism, decision 
makers must initially evaluate the threat. This evaluation must 
include the following: 
 
 
Analysis of 
the threat’s 
nature 
Identifying the 
threat’s source 
Identifying the 
timeline when 
the threat is 
anticipated to 
materialize 
Assessment of 
the threat’s 
imminence 
 
The suicide bomber infrastructure is instructive in highlighting 
the complexities of determining whether an individual is a legitimate 
target; it is important to recall that four distinct actors are necessary 
for a successful suicide bombing:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36. See THOMAS S. SZAYNA ET AL., IMPROVING ARMY PLANNING FOR FUTURE 
MULTINATIONAL COALITION OPERATIONS 324 (2001).  
37. See Mark L. Rockefeller, The “Imminent Threat” Requirement for the 
Use of Preemptive Military Force: Is it Time for a Non-Temporal 
Standard?, 33 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 131 (2005) (discussing the 
imminence standard). 
248 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Targeted Killing 
 
TARGET—The Suicide Bombing Infrastructure 
 
 
a) Planner—legitimate target at all times 
 
b)   Bomber—legitimate target solely when operationally engaged 
 
c) Logistician—legitimate target when involved in all aspects of 
implementing suicide bombing but, unlike the planner, not a 
legitimate target when not involved in a specific, future attack 
 
 
d) Financier—a largely unexplored subject in the context of 
targeted killings, the financier is a legitimate target when involved 
in wiring or laundering money, both of which are essential for 
terrorist attacks. There is significant room for debate regarding 
when the financier is not in the act of financing. To that extent, 
the question is whether the financier is more akin to the “bomber” 
or the “logistician.” Arguably, due to the central role the financier 
plays in the structure, the correct placement is between the 
“logistician” and the “planner.”  
 
 
Imminence must be understood from two distinct perspectives: 
the imminent threat posed by the bomber and the future threat posed 
by a planner or financier considered legitimate targets, even when not 
directly engaged in planning or implementing a suicide bombing. In 
order for a state’s actions under either scenario to be considered legal, 
the limits of self-defense must be defined. The policy of targeted 
killing should only be used in response to imminent threats rather 
than those that are distant, unviable, or merely foreseeable.38 
38. Jameel Jaffer, Targeted Killing and the Courts: A Response to Alan 
Dershowitz, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5315, 5317 (2011) (discussing the 
imminence requirement for lethal force).  
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Targeted killings based on vague threats are grounded in revenge and 
emotion rather than in objective, criteria-based decision making. Put 
simply, a legitimate target is an individual who, according to 
intelligence information, poses a direct and immediate threat to 
national security. Here, the notion of proportionality in self-defense is 
operationalized in the plainest manner—the decision maker must 
determine whether lethal force is the appropriate response to the 
threat posed in order to repel or deter that imminent threat. It is 
important, therefore, to recognize that as definitions of imminence 
become broader and more flexible, the parameters of that 
proportionality analysis stretch as well.39  
C. Is the Intelligence Actionable? 
Threat analysis refers to the nature of the target and his or her 
planned activities and attacks.40 Assessing the source of the 
information about the target and the planned attack is an equally 
vital aspect of the decision-making process. Information provided by a 
human source should be analyzed closely for possible biases, grudges, 
or personal agendas that might taint its reliability. Therefore, source 
analysis becomes a fundamental component of the criteria-based 
approach. Signal intelligence includes information gathered from 
sources such as intercepted phone and email conversations.41 Open 
sources, such as the internet and newspapers, are generally available 
and can often help paint a landscape against which a perceived threat 
can be evaluated. The combination of these three sources allows the 
intelligence community to develop an accurate operational picture 
from which to work. In this information gathering process, the 
intelligence produced from UAV reconnaissance is highly valuable, 
particularly with regard to tracking targets and ensuring that the 
person under analysis is actually the person who poses the threat. But 
this type of intelligence alone simply cannot be a substitute for the 
complex web of information and analysis woven together using all 
three sources of intelligence described above. It is essential, therefore, 
to guard against over-reliance on the extraordinary capabilities of 
modern technology. 
39. Cf. Benjamin McKelvey, Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of 
Suspected Terrorists: The Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing 
Power, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1353, 1368 (2011) (noting that the 
imminence standard becomes useless if the decision-maker must go 
through months of evaluation). 
40. Amos Guiora & Monica Hakimi, Targeted Killing is Lawful if Conducted 
in Accordance with the Rule of Law, ABA LAW J., Apr. 1, 2012, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/targeted_killing_is_lawf
ul_if_conducted_in_accordance_with_the_rule_of_law. 
41. See Signals Intelligence, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY CENT. SECURITY 
SERV., http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.shtml (last updated Sept. 9, 
2011). 
250 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
Targeted Killing 
 
Ultimately, the question central to this operational puzzle is 
whether the acquired information is actionable. The main goal of 
decision makers is to enhance the objectivity in their decision-making 
process. The chart below, developed to evaluate detention decisions, is 
an example of articulated guidelines for determining whether the 
intelligence is sufficiently actionable. 
 
 
 
 
Test Prong Definition/ Use 
 
Reliable 
 
 Past interactions show the source to be 
dependable provider of correct information 
 Determination as to whether the 
information is useful and accurate 
 Requires analysis by case officer into 
source’s personal agendas or grudges with 
respect to identified target 
 
 
Viable 
 
 Is it possible that an attack could occur in 
accordance with the source’s information 
(Based on source’s information, such a 
terrorist attack is both possible and 
feasible) 
 
 
Relevant 
 
 The information has bearing on upcoming 
events 
 Consider both timeliness of the information 
and whether it is time sensitive, thereby 
imposing the need for immediate 
counterterrorism measures 
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Corroborated 
 
 Another source confirms the information in 
part or whole 
 This second source must also meet the 
above reliability test 
 
 
D. Is the Response Proportional? 
Even if a legitimate target is identified and the intelligence about 
that target is actionable, the use of lethal force, in this case a targeted 
killing, is lawful only if it meets the international law obligation of 
proportionality.42 As noted above, an attack violates the principle of 
proportionality if the expected civilian casualties will be excessive in 
relation to the military advantage gained.43 Proportionality is a 
difficult concept to apply in any conflict situation, but it is absolutely 
essential for the protection of the civilian population.44 This analysis 
requires intelligence not just about the target of the attack, but also 
about who and what else is in the area and is likely to be killed, 
injured, or destroyed (when dealing with property) as a result of the 
attack.45 It also requires a complete evaluation of significance of 
reaching the target.46  
Of the principles discussed, proportionality receives the greatest 
attention and is the most scrutinized.47 It is also, I would suggest, the 
most problematic, most misconstrued, and least attainable. 
Proportionality is not about equality of capability or power of the two 
sides. State versus non-state conflict is inherently disproportionate. 
42. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 46 (3d prtg. 2009) 
(“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited.”).  
43. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.  
44. See W.J. Fenrick, The Law Applicable to Targeting and Proportionality 
After Operation Allied Force: A View from the Outside, in YEARBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 58 (2000). 
45. See id. at 75.  
46. See id.  
47. See Enzo Cannizzaro, The Role of Proportionality in the Law of 
International Countermeasures, 12 EURO. J. INT’L L. 889, 889 (2001).  
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History is replete with examples of disproportionate warfare between 
states, much less between states and non-state actors. War is often 
won in large part by the use of significant, indeed overwhelming or 
disproportionate, force in order to defeat the other military. 
Proportionality seeks to minimize harm to the civilian population 
within the context of conflict, not to equalize the capabilities of 
warring states. 
In the person-specific operational counterterrorism model, 
however, the legal principle of proportionality in self-defense is also a 
significant component of the legal decision-making process. Here, 
proportionality means that state action, proactive and reactive alike, 
must be proportional to the threat posed, whether actual or perceived, 
because in each specific instance, the state is using, and justifying the 
use of, force in self-defense.48 Operationalized, the term means the 
commander must be very selective both with respect to force used and 
individuals targeted.49  
It is precisely at this confluence of legal principles and decision 
making that proportionality has become out of proportion in the 
framework of the U.S. targeted killing program. International law 
requires that targeting an individual with lethal force as self-defense 
can only be undertaken when the threat posed is such as to require 
the use of force to mitigate or eliminate the threat; that is, the use of 
force is proportional to the threat and the need to deter it.50 At the 
same time, international law also requires that the commander take 
into account the likely civilian harm and refrain from any attack 
where the expected collateral damage (civilian harm) is excessive 
given the value gained by killing the targeted individual.51  
As the discussion below will highlight, the increasingly flexible 
and broad notion of imminence and threat have significant effects on 
the notion of “military advantage gained” (i.e., the value of the 
target) and therefore on the application of the proportionality 
principle governing the minimization of civilian harm.52 If all threats 
48. See Fenrick, supra note 44, at 58 (stating that “there must be an 
acceptable relation between the legitimate destructive effect and 
undesirable collateral effects”).  
49. Id. at 75.  
50. See Blum & Heymann, supra note 33, at 146 (stating that targeted 
killings are allowed only in limited circumstances such as self-defense 
when the person poses an immediate threat). 
51. See Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: 
Operationalizing the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. 
NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 71 (2010) (“Whether a commander chooses to engage 
will depend on whether the person poses a threat at that moment and 
the likelihood of mission success.”). 
52. See infra Part IV.  
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are so imminent and dangerous as to justify the use of lethal force in 
self-defense, then the value of taking them out will be great enough to 
justify significant amounts of civilian harm—essentially meaning that 
broad understandings of the first concept of proportionality eliminate 
the need for the second, equally essential, proportionality analysis. 
The result: a targeted killing policy not grounded in sufficient legal 
and moral footing. 
IV. The Drone Policy 
The U.S. drone policy raises profoundly important questions 
regarding the very nature of operational counterterrorism; its 
implementation reveals how morality and the rule of law are applied 
in an inherently ambiguous and amorphous paradigm. At present, the 
increasingly broader and more flexible definition of imminence, 
combined with a continually growing reliance on sleek new 
technology, is highly problematic and raises significant concerns about 
whether law and morality are truly serving as the necessary guiding 
force here. Law not only provides a state with the right to engage 
those who deliberately and randomly target innocent civilians—it also 
provides the essential guiding framework for the extent to which and 
manner by which the state can target and engage those individuals. 
Simply articulating an aggressive, tough on terrorism policy is not 
sufficient. Rather, the devil truly is in the details: the state must 
carefully define both the limits of force and how that limited force is 
to be applied. Such a carefully-defined limit and application of force is 
the essence of both morality in armed conflict and the rule of law. In 
contrast, deliberately operating in an open-ended paradigm with 
opaque parameters where state power is broadly defined and 
implemented opens the door, unnecessarily, to significant violations of 
morality and law. 
Unlimited drone warfare where limits, targets, and goals are not 
narrowly defined creates an operational environment in which anyone 
killed, regardless of whether intended or unintended, is considered a 
legitimate target. This expanded articulation of legitimate target, 
premised on significant expansion of tolerable collateral damage, 
creates a slippery slope that inevitably results in the deaths of 
otherwise innocent individuals. The allure of modern technology has 
led many decision makers to minimize the need to carefully 
distinguish between the individuals who pose a threat and those who 
do not. 
Decision makers must not lose sight of the fact that targeted 
killing, on the basis of received and actionable intelligence 
information, is inherently a problematic; it poses extraordinary 
operational challenges that must be resolved precisely because of 
targeted killing’s importance to lawful self-defense. It must be 
operationalized in the most careful, narrow, and specific manner 
possible—meaning that a discriminating analysis of who is a 
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legitimate target must be matched by equally discriminating analysis 
of who constitutes collateral damage, how much collateral damage is 
likely, and, most important, how much collateral damage is legally 
and morally acceptable or tolerable.  
Morality in armed conflict is not a mere mantra: it imposes 
significant demands on the nation state that must adhere to limits 
and considerations beyond simply killing “the other side.” For better 
or worse, drone warfare of today will become the norm of tomorrow. 
Multiply the number of attacks conducted regularly in the present 
and you have the operational reality of future warfare. It is important 
to recall that drone policy is effective on two distinct levels: it takes 
the fight to terrorists directly involved, either in past or future 
attacks, and serves as a powerful deterrent for those considering 
involvement in terrorist activity.53 However, its importance and 
effectiveness must not hinder critical conversation, particularly with 
respect to defining imminence and legitimate target. The overly broad 
definition, “flexible” in the Obama Administration’s words,54 raises 
profound concerns regarding how imminence is applied. That concern 
is concrete for the practical import of Brennan’s phrasing is a 
dramatic broadening of the definition of legitimate target. It is also 
important to recall that operators—military, CIA or private 
contractors—are responsible for implementing executive branch 
guidelines and directives.55 For that very reason, the approach 
articulated by Brennan on behalf of the administration is troubling. 
This approach, while theoretically appealing, fails on a number of 
levels. First, it undermines and does a profound injustice to the 
military and security personnel tasked with operationalizing defense of 
the state, particularly commanders and officers. When senior 
leadership deliberately obfuscates policy to create wiggle room and 
plausible deniability, junior commanders (those at the tip of the 
spear, in essence) have no framework to guide their operational 
choices.56 The results can be disastrous, as the example of Abu Ghraib 
shows all too well.57 Second, it gravely endangers the civilian 
population. What is done in the collective American name poses 
53. See Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 
DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 107–09 (2010) (explaining the geographic 
expansiveness of drone policy and its use to prevent future attacks). 
54. Brennan, supra note 30.  
55. See Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law 
Implications 25 (Background Note for the Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. Annual 
Meeting, Hum. Rts. Inst., & Colum. L. Sch., Mar. 25, 2011).  
56. See Amos N. Guiora & Martha Minow, National Objectives in the 
Hands of Junior Leaders, in COUNTERING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 179, 184–85 (James J. F. Forest, ed., 2007). 
57. See id. at 184.  
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danger both to our safety, because of the possibility of blow-back 
attacks in response to a drone attack that caused significant collateral 
damage, and to our values, because the policy is loosely articulated 
and problematically implemented.58 Third, the approach completely 
undermines our commitment to law and morality that defines a 
nation predicated on the rule of law. If everyone who constitutes 
“them” is automatically a legitimate target, then careful analysis of 
threats, imminence, proportionality, credibility, reliability, and other 
factors become meaningless. Self-defense becomes a mantra that 
justifies all action, regardless of method or procedure. 
Accordingly, the increasing reliance on modern technology must 
raise a warning flag. Drone warfare is conducted using modern 
technology with the explicit assumption that the technology of the 
future is more sophisticated, more complex, and more lethal. Its 
sophistication and complexity, however, must not be viewed as a holy 
grail. While armed conflict involves the killing of individuals, the 
relevant questions must remain who, why, how, and when. Seductive 
methods must not lead us to reflexively conclude that we can charge 
ahead. Indeed, the more sophisticated the mechanism, the more 
questions we must ask. Capability cannot substitute for process and 
technology cannot substitute for analysis.  
V. Conclusion 
The state’s right to engage in preemptive self-defense must be 
subject to powerful restraints and conditions. A measured, cautious 
approach to targeted killing reflects the understanding that the state 
has the absolute, but not unlimited, right and obligation to protect its 
civilian population.  
Targeted killing is a legal, legitimate, and effective form of active 
self-defense provided that it is conducted in accordance with 
international law, morality, and a narrow definition of legitimate 
target. Self-defense, according to international law, is subject to 
limits; otherwise, administration officials would not press for 
flexibility in defining imminent. The call for a flexible conception of 
imminence is a deeply troubling manifestation of a “slippery slope;” it 
opens the door to operational counterterrorism not conducted in 
accordance with international law or principles of morality. Therefore, 
analyzing the reliability of intelligence, assessing the threat posed, and 
determining whether the identified target is a legitimate target 
facilitates lawful, moral, and effective targeted killing.  
58. See id. (discussing the illustrative “black flag” incident in which fifty-six 
innocent Israeli civilians were killed after junior leaders mistakenly 
interpreted a commanding officer’s comment that God should have 
“mercy” on any villager out after curfew to be a command to shoot 
anyone returning from the fields after curfew). 
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Expansiveness and flexibility are at odds with a measured 
approach to targeted killing precisely because they eliminate our sense 
of what is proportional, in the broadest sense of the term. Flexibility 
with regard to imminence and threat-perception means that the 
identification of legitimate targets, the true essence of moral 
operational counterterrorism, becomes looser and less precise. In turn, 
broader notions of legitimate target and the right of self-defense 
introduce greater flexibility with regard to collateral damage—
resulting in a wider understanding of who constitutes collateral 
damage and how much collateral damage is justified in the course of 
targeting a particular threat. Flexibility and the absence of criteria, 
process, and procedure result in notions of proportionality—which 
would normally guide decision making and operations—that are out of 
proportion. In the high-stakes world of operational counterterrorism, 
there is no room for imprecision and casual definitions; the risks, to 
innocent civilians on both sides and to our fundamental values, are 
just too high. 
With respect to the strict scrutiny standard and recommendation 
for establishment of a “drone court”: while the proposal explicitly 
calls for changing the nature of the relationship between the executive 
and the judicial branches of the government, it would serve to 
minimize intelligence-based mistakes in operational counterterrorism. 
To ensure enforcement, a president that acts in contravention to the 
FISA court’s ruling could be liable for committing a crime and 
possibly an impeachable offense.   
The proposal does not limit the state’s fundamental right to self-
defense. Rather, it creates a process seeking to objectify 
counterterrorism by seeking to establish standards for determining 
whether intelligence information is admissible.  
The practical impact? A drone policy predicated on the rule of 
law, morality in armed conflict and articulation of policy effectiveness.  
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